We show that put warrants can reduce financing costs when managers know more about the firm's future prospects than do outside investors. Put warrants are shown to be an efficient security in mitigating adverse selection costs in the sense that firms can credibly reveal favorable private information without having to resort to 'money burning' actions or inefficient investment decisions. Among the model's implications are that (i) put warrants are effective whether or not they are attached directly to equity shares, (ii) the number of puts issued must exceed the number of new equity shares issued, and (iii) a ceiling exists on the amount of project financing that a firm can successfully raise. Additionally our analysis provides practical insights into how the size and exercise price of the put warrant offering affect issues such as corporate control and the probability of default.
Introduction
The adverse selection problem that confronts firms seeking external equity funding has received considerable attention from researchers since Myers and Majluf's (1984) seminal paper. Central to the problem is the information asymmetry that exists between managers and outside investors. When managers know that the issue price of new shares is below their true value, positive NPV projects that require equity funding may be passed by if the dilution to existing shareholders is sufficiently great. Ways that firms can mitigate this underinvestment inefficiency has received much of the research effort. Our paper extends this line of research by examining a relatively new corporate-issued security, put warrants.
Corporate-issued put warrants (hereafter simply 'puts') give investors the right to sell shares back to the firm at a future date at a fixed exercise price. In return, the firm receives an up front tax-free cash premium. To our knowledge, the first instance of a firm issuing puts on its own stock occurred in 1988, when Thermo Cardiosystems attached puts to shares sold in its initial public offering. 1 More than a hundred firms followed Thermo's lead in the decade to follow. 2 The majority of these firms issued puts as part of open market share repurchase programs. In this context, puts presumably send a positive signal to the market by binding the firm to follow through on its repurchase program at a floor price (Innes (1997) ). On relatively few occasions, firms issued puts by themselves or in conjunction with new equity. Our research can be thought of as largely normative in the sense that we focus on the more limited latter context where firms use puts to raise external funds.
To gain an insight into the basic idea behind our model, consider a firm that is either of a high or low type in the sense that it has favorable or unfavorable private information, respectively, about its future prospects. The inverse relation between put payoffs and underlying share prices makes puts an efficient security that a high type can use to mitigate 1 The puts gave the holder the right to sell a Thermo Cardiosystems share back to the firm at the initial public offering price at year-end 1991, 1992, or 1993. 2 A search of SEC's Edgar Database of publicly available filings from January 1994 to March 1999 found 102 firms that issued puts on their own stock on one or more occasions. 83 firms were identified as having issued puts as part of share repurchase programs. Of the remaining firms, 12 were identified as having issued puts in combination with new equity. 1 adverse selection costs. The intuition is that expected payoffs are lower for puts issued by a high type than for those issued by a low type. Consequently, puts issued at what would be a fair price by a high type would be underpriced if issued at the same price by a low type.
We establish conditions under which this difference in the intrinsic value of puts results in a high type being able to fully fund positive NPV projects by issuing a combination of fairly priced equity and puts that a low type rationally chooses not to match. In the separating equilibrium, the low type does not mimic the high type's joint put-equity issue because the cost to existing shareholders of issuing underpriced puts exceeds the gain from issuing overpriced new equity.
One might expect that the high type can always gain separation by issuing puts. To the contrary, our analysis shows that there is a ceiling on the amount of project financing that the high type can successfully raise. Puts cannot be used by the high type to achieve separation when the required external funding approaches the low type's expected cash flow that is available for its existing equityholders and any new security holders. This would be true, for example, when a firm faces a debt-overhang problem in which existing debtholders' financial claim approaches the combined value of assets-in-place and the NPV of the investment opportunity. In such a scenario, the low type's existing equityholders have little to lose by mimicing a put offering of the high type, but much to gain.
Another implication of our analysis is that puts do not have to be attached to new equity shares to be effective in mitigating adverse selection costs. Puts are effective regardless because the cost to existing shareholders of selling underpriced puts is the same no matter who holds the puts. In fact, we show that firms can avoid adverse selection costs by raising the required external funding solely through puts. We further show that if equity is to be issued along with puts, then the number of puts issued must exceed the number of shares issued. The economic rationale behind this result can be understood by recognizing that separation is not possible unless the high type can promise new security holders a payoff in poor outcomes that is large enough to dissuade the low type from mimicing. We show that this can only be achieved by issuing sufficiently more puts than shares.
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Our analysis also provides practical guidance to managers about the ramifications of choosing a specific exercise price and number of puts from among the multiple combinations that achieve separation. In particular, our model shows that firms that wish to minimize the probability of default on its contractual payment to putholders and maximize the fraction of equity retained by its existing equityholders ought to set a high exercise price. Given that a firm selects a high exercise price, it then needs to consider a trade-off. If the firm merely wishes to minimize the probability of default, our model shows that it ought to issue relatively few puts at a high exercise price. If the firm instead wishes to maximize existing equityholders' fractional ownership in the firm, then it ought to issue relatively more puts at a high exercise price.
Our paper builds on a substantial literature that examines ways in which firms can mitigate adverse selection costs. The financial decisions examined in previous research include dividend policy [John and Williams (1985) and Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) ], the overpricing of the equity issue [Giammarino (1988) ], the underpricing of the equity issue [Allen and Faulhaber (1989) ; Grinblatt and Hwang (1989); and Welch (1989) ], the timing of the investment project [Lucas and McDonald (1990) ], and the scale of the investment project [Krasker (1986) ]. Separation achieved via puts differs in an important way from the above mentioned papers. Daniel and Titman (1995) point out that the separating equilibria in these other models are characterized by either 'money burning' or inefficient investment.
A signal is typically referred to as 'money burning' if the signalling action is equally costly for all firms and provides no direct benefits to the signalling firm. For example, in the dividend signalling model of John and Williams (1985) , investors must pay taxes on dividends. Signals that rely on inefficient investment decisions to achieve separation also result in a deadweight loss of wealth. For example, in Krasker (1986) , firms gain separation by scaling back on positive NPV projects. In contrast, the separating equilibrium presented in this paper is non-dissipative in that it is characterized by neither 'money burning' nor by inefficient investment.
This non-dissipative characteristic follows from a key dimension on which our model differs from these others. Specifically, we do not restrict the securities issued by the firm to be nondecreasing in the firm's cash flows. This difference is critical in light of Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Nachman and Noe (1994) , who show that non-dissipative separation is not possible for firms limited to issuing securities with nondecreasing payoffs when cash flows across firm types are ordered by stochastic dominance. With non-decreasing payoffs, the low type can always mimic any security offering of the high type without dilution to its existing equityholders, leaving the high type with no way of gaining non-dissipative separation. We show that securities can have decreasing payoffs, but still not achieve nondissipative separation. In the context of our model, this means that the ratio of puts to shares issued must not only exceed one, but must do so by a sufficient amount. Moreover, we show that for sufficiently high levels of required project financing, non-dissipative separation is not possible regardless of the ratio of puts to shares issued.
Ours is not the only non-dissipative solution to the adverse selection problem that has been suggested. Our paper is perhaps most closely related in spirit to the examples offered by Brennan and Kraus (1987) in which firms have large amounts of high-risk debt outstanding. In their examples, the high type achieves non-dissipative separation by issuing equity that not only fully funds the investment but also retires a large amount of high-risk debt.
The idea is that the equity for high-risk debt swap would be too costly for the low type because it would pay too much for the debt. In contrast with the empirical prediction of a positive stock price effect, however, empirical research documents that leverage-decreasing transactions (equity for debt) are accompanied by significantly negative effects, perhaps due to investors' concerns about agency issues (e.g., managements' desire to preserve their jobs). 3 In this paper, we show that puts are an effective signalling mechanism even under circumstances where the firm does not have substantial amounts of high-risk debt outstanding. In addition, put issuances are leverage increasing and are therefore not subject to the agency-problem concerns that are created by a leverage-decreasing transactions.
by simply issuing rights to shareholders of record. Because existing equityholders internalize any mispricing of the rights, capital can be raised without having to resort to inefficient investment decisions or 'money burning'. Eckbo and Masulis themselves, however, call attention to the practical drawbacks of rights offerings. These include excessive transaction costs for shareholders who receive rights and agency problems created by what is effectively a negative dividend. In contrast, puts do not appear to have an agency problem as a sideeffect. To the contrary, puts give strong incentives to management that aligns its interests with those of equityholders in that when the firm performs poorly, wealth is diverted to putholders.
Another innovative solution without deadweight costs is offered by Dybvig and Zender (1991) , who argue that shareholders would be better off under a pooling equilibrium in which ex ante contracts were written that gave managers an incentive to take all positive NPV projects. Persons (1994) , however, points out that it is in the interest of a high type's existing equityholders to break the pooling equilibrium. This is because the high type can increase share value by renegotiating the contract prior to the issue-invest decision, making such a contractual solution dynamically inconsistent. In contrast, Person's (1994) caveat of dynamic consistency is satisfied by our model in that we focus on non-dissipative separating equilibria in which equity is fairly priced. In addition, Titman (1984) and Daniel and Titman (1995) make the case that often a firm's current share price affects its real operations. Consequently, there may be an incentive to signal favorable private information even if a contract could be written along the lines suggested by Dybvig and Zender (1991) .
Puts, on the other hand, allow firms to signal private information in a way advocated by Titman (1984) and Daniel and Titman (1995) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we lay out the model's assumptions. In Section 3, we establish conditions under which puts achieve a non-dissipative separating equilibrium. A numerical example intended to illustrate the intuition behind how firms can use puts to mitigate adverse selection costs is provided in Section 4. In
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Section 5, we analyze properties of the equilibrium. Finally, we conclude in Section 6 with a summary and a discussion of directions for future research .
2 Model t = 0 t = 1 • Firm type is revealed to manager.
• Firm receives cash flows from • Firm raises $I to fund project by its assets-in-place and project. issuing a combination of equity and puts.
• Firm is liquidated.
• Investors purchase new equity and puts at market prices. Our two-date model includes a group of risk-neutral investors and a firm that at t = 0 has assets-in-place and a positive NPV investment opportunity which requires I dollars of external funding. At t = 1 assets-in-place and the new project combine to generate cash flow net of existing senior claims of C dollars, where g (C|θ, I) defines the density function on C ∈ C, C and θ represents firm type. C can be thought of as the cash flow available for existing equity and any newly issued financial securities after existing senior claims such as existing debt have been satisfied. We assume that the firm is liquidated at t = 1 with C being distributed to financial claimants.
The sole source of non-transparency for investors in our model is the stochastic property of C. Recognize that our decision to model C as the joint density function of cash flows generated by the assets-in-place and the investment opportunity allows us the flexibility of attributing the information asymmetry to either or both. We assume that there are two types of firms, θ L and θ H such that θ H is a higher type than θ L in the sense that cash flow densities are ordered by the monotonically increasing likelihood ratio (MLR) property.
Specifically,
which implies first-order stochastic dominance. Firm type is assumed to be the private 6 information of the firm (i.e., its managers). In other words, investors know the potential cash flow densities but do not know whether the firm is of a high or low type. Conditional on the firm funding the project, the combined full-information value of existing equity and any newly issued securities for a firm type i is
The number of investors is assumed to be large enough to ensure competitively rational capital markets that purchase financial securities at prices equal to their expected future cash flows conditional on all available information. With the restriction that both types issue securities such that the net proceeds are equal to the required funding, the competitive rationality condition for firm type i is
where as ψ i (C) denotes the net payoff on newly issued securities for firm type i.
We assume that if a type i firm does not undertake the investment opportunity, then its expected cash flow is V i . We can now formally state our assumption that the investment opportunity has a positive NPV:
Finally, we assume that firms maximize the intrinsic value of their equity or, equivalently, that firms maximize the wealth of its shareholders who do not purchase any of the newly issued securities. Formally, the objective of firm type i is to issue a set of securities
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium therefore consists of a set of securities {ψ i } i∈{L,H} such that both firm types choose securities to maximize the intrinsic value of equity, the securities are priced fairly by the capital markets based on their conjecture of the firm's type, and capital markets are correct in their conjectures about firm type. We will refer to an equilibrium as non-dissipative if existing equityholders of both firm types receive their full-information value.
Lemma 1 A non-dissipative Bayesian Nash separating equilibrium exists if and only if there exist securities, {ψ i } i∈{L,H} , such that they satisfy (CR i ) and
Proof. See appendix.
We refer to the above equilibrium, if it exists, as non-dissipative because there is no investment distortion and existing equityholders get their full-information payoffs. The above lemma is a restatement of the equilibrium requirements in terms of standard (IC i ) and (IR i ) constraints that will allow us to find conditions under which such securities exist. 4
In fact, we will later show that it is possible that there do not exist securities that satisfy the conditions for a non-dissipative equilibrium.
An interesting characteristic of a non-dissipative equilibrium, if it exists, follows immediately from (IC i ). 5 This necessary condition tells us that standard securities such as equity, debt, convertible bonds et cetera by themselves will not lead to a non-dissipative separating equilibrium.
Lemma 2 A necessary condition for {ψ i } i∈{L,H} to satisfy incentive compatibility is that
The intuition is straightforward. When security payoffs are restricted to being nonde-creasing in firm cash flows, the expected combined payoff on securities issued by the low type is less than or equal to the payoff on identical securities issued by the high type. Thus the low type can always mimic any security offering of the high type without dilution to its existing equityholders. Under such circumstances there is no way for the high type to gain non-dissipative separation. Thus, non-dissipative separation can not be achieved when the firm is limited to issuing standard securities like equity, debt, convertible debt, etc.
In understanding the contribution of our analysis that follows, it is important to recognize that Lemma 2 is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. Whether a non-dissipative separating equilibrium exists depends critically on factors such as firms' cash flow densities, required amount of project financing, and security issuance options. This necessary condition is, in fact, quite weak. We will show that there can exist security combinations that satisfy the necessary condition but violate incentive compatibility. We will also show that if the high type firm issues a sufficient number of puts then it can satisfy both the (CR i ) and (IC i ) constraints and, consequently, achieve non-dissipative separation. As Lemma 2
suggests, we will see that the number of puts has to be greater than the number of new shares issued.
Non-Dissipative Separating Equilibrium with Puts
For reasons of tractability, we limit candidate equilibria to those in which the low type funds the investment entirely with equity and the high type issues a combination of puts and equity. This restriction is without loss of generality as it can be shown that for any separating equilibrium in which the low type issues a combination of equity and some positive number of puts, there also exists an equilibrium in which the low type issues only equity.
We restrict firms to raise no more than the required investment of I dollars. We assume that a type i firm issues new equity which gives α i percent of outstanding equity to the new 9 equityholders. Normalizing the number of shares after the equity issuance to one, the high type issues puts which when exercised allow putholders to sell β percent of outstanding equity to the firm at an exercise price of X dollars per share. Consequently, if putholders exercise, the firm is required to pay βX dollars to buy back β percent of its shares. Recognize that the firm's realized cash flow is insufficient to meet the contractual payoff to putholders when C is less than βX. When this is true, we assume that the putholders receive the entire cash flow C. In practice, the put contract may give the firm the right to pay off in-the-money puts with either cash or newly issued equity. All our results go through with an alternative assumption that when cash flow is insufficient to meet the contractual payoff, existing equityholders relinquish their ownership to putholders. Our results also go through with an alternate assumption that the uncertainty is resolved by the time of put maturity and the stock price at that time reflects the full-information value.
We impose three additional constraints on our parameter space:
The no-repurchase constraint (N R H ) restricts the high type from issuing puts valued at greater than the required investment level and simultaneously committing to use the excess proceeds to repurchase shares. Together with (CR H ) , (N R H ) can also be stated in terms of the value of the puts, that is P H ≤ I. The no-overissue constraint (N OI H ) ensures that the high type is not committing to buy back more than the total number of shares that it has outstanding. The no-overprice constraint (N OP H ) ensures that the high type does not set the exercise price to be greater than the highest possible t = 1 share price, which we calculate immediately below in equation (1).
To determine the C at which putholders exercise, we first need to calculate the t = 1 share price, S, as a function of C. Recognizing that the combined t = 1 payoff to equityholders and putholders must equal C, we can calculate the share price conditional on 10 exercise as follows:
Putholders will exercise whenever the exercise price exceeds the share price, that is when
Consequently, when C < X, the contractual payoff to putholders is
However, when C < βX, the firm's realized cash flow is insufficient to meet the contractual payoff to putholders. In this case we assume that putholders receive the entire cash flow C.
To summarize, putholders receive the following:
Thus we can calculate the expected payoff or, equivalently, the value of puts issued by a type i firm:
We can then calculate the value of equity for high and low types that issue securities in line with investor beliefs:
Now that we have calculated putholder and equityholder payoffs, we are ready to characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for a non-dissipative separating equilibrium.
Lemma 3 For a given I, a non-dissipative separating equilibrium exists if β, X, α H , α L satisfy (N R H ) , (N OI H ), and (N OP H ) and
Equations (3) and (4) are obtained from the high and low type's competitive rationality constraints (CR H ) and (CR L ), respectively. Equation (5), which is obtained from the low type's incentive compatibility constraint (IC L ), has a straightforward interpretation when rewritten as follows:
The low type will not mimic the high type's joint put-equity offering when the loss to existing shareholders from selling underpriced puts (LHS of (6)) exceeds the gain from selling overpriced new equity (RHS of (6)).
Lemma 2 lays out the sufficiency conditions for a non-dissipative separating equilibrium to exist. It does not, however, establish whether these sufficiency conditions can be met.
Proposition 1 establishes that as long as the investment is not too high relative to the value of the low type, then a non-dissipative separating equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1 There exists a non-dissipative separating equilibrium for all I ≤ I T , where
and X T is defined as follows,
Proposition 1 defines X T as the exercise price at which puts issued by either the high or low type on all of its outstanding shares have identical expected payoffs. Suppose that the 12 high type funds the investment entirely with puts on all of its outstanding shares at this threshold exercise price X T . If the proceeds from such a put offering are sufficient to fully fund the investment, then the low type has no opportunity to sell overpriced equity and hence has no incentive to mimic. We define the threshold investment, I T , as this investment that is fully funded by the high type issuing puts on all of its outstanding shares at threshold exercise price X T .
For all investments below I T , (6) can be satisfied by choosing X < X T such that P H = I, α H = 0 and β = 1. This is because the MLR property implies that for all β = 1 and X < X T , the put value for the low type is strictly greater than the put value for the high type and the RHS of (6) is zero. In other words, the high type can fully fund all investments below I T by issuing puts on all of its outstanding shares at an exercise price less than X T , leaving the low type with no way of issuing overpriced securities and thus no incentive to mimic.
For all investments above I T , (IC L ) cannot be satisfied. To see this, we can refer back to (IC L ) rewritten as equation (6). For a separating equilibrium to hold, the underpricing of puts must be greater than the overpricing of new equity. Consider an investment opportunity that requires I T dollars of external financing. We know that the high type can gain separation by choosing β = 1 and X = X T . Now consider an investment opportunity that requires an amount of external financing larger than I T . If we fix β = 1, 6 the high type can raise additional funds either through puts by increasing X or through new equity by increasing α H . 7 Increasing X beyond X T , however, makes the puts of the high type more valuable than those of the low type and clearly violates equation (6). The alternative is to increase α H from zero, but a positive α H makes the RHS positive as the high type's equity is always more valuable than the low type's. Consequently, with the LHS put underpricing 6 A decrease in β will have no impact on the arguments to follow. 7 If we relax (N RH ), the high type can in theory commit to purchase equity at the full information value EH , which is dilutive to the low type. It can be shown that when αH is allowed to be negative, an investment larger than IT can be financed in a non-dissipative separating equilibrium. Although this may seem a radical financing strategy in practice, it is at least feasible that a firm can raise funds from a put offering that are not only sufficient to fund the investment but also to repurchase outstanding equity.
equal to zero, equation (6) is again violated.
An implication of Proposition 1 is that puts cannot be used to gain separation when the required external funding approaches the low type's expected cash flow that is available for its existing equityholders and any new security holders. This would be true, for example, when a firm faces a debt-overhang problem in which existing debtholders' financial claim approaches the combined value of assets-in-place and the NPV of the investment opportunity. In such a scenario, the low type's existing equityholders have little to lose by mimicing a put offering of the high type. Hence the debt overhang results in the high type being unable to use puts to gain separation.
One characteristic of the non-dissipative separating equilibrium described above is that the number of puts issued has to exceed the number of shares issued, which is stated in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 If a non-dissipative equilibrium with puts exists, then β > α H .
The intuition for this result, which follows immediately from Lemma 2, can be understood by recognizing that separation is not possible unless the high type can promise new security holders a payoff in poor outcomes that is large enough to dissuade the low type from mimicing. Competitively rational securities markets imply that if new security holders are given a larger payoff in poor outcomes, then they must receive a smaller payoff in good outcomes. When a firm is limited to issuing securities that are nondecreasing in the realized cash flow, the largest payoff that can be given to new security holders is accomplished by issuing straight debt. Separation can only be achieved if the high type is able to promise larger payoffs in poor outcomes, which is accomplished by issuing sufficiently more puts than shares.
14 The following stylized numerical example is intended to clarify the intuition behind our results. Consider a firm with a positive NPV investment opportunity requiring I = 5 of external funding. Outside investors believe that it is equally likely that the firm is of a high or low type, θ H or θ L , such that
with C = 0 and C = 100.
Without puts, the firm faces an adverse selection problem because with C = 0 it cannot When the NPV is less than the underpricing of 1.67, the trial solution is not an equilibrium as the high type will forego the project because the dilution to existing equityholders' ownership exceeds the project's NPV. This is the classic Myers and Majluf (1984) underinvestment problem. With puts, we show that a separating equilibrium exists in which the high type fully funds the project with fairly priced puts and equity, doing away with the underinvestment problem. If instead the NPV is greater than the underpricing of 1.67, the high type will issue equity and invest because the project's NPV leaves existing equityholders better off even though they must share the NPV with new equityholders. Although the underinvestment problem is avoided, such an all-equity pooling equilibrium does not survive
the Intuitive Criterion refinement (Cho and Kreps (1987) ) when we introduce puts into the firm's securities opportunity set. This is because a credible defection exists in which the high type's existing equityholders capture the entire NPV by issuing a combination of fairly priced puts and equity.
Now consider a trial solution where the low type funds the investment entirely with equity and the high type issues a combination of equity and puts which give their holders the option to sell β = 10% of outstanding equity at an exercise price of X = 75 per share (when we normalize the number of outstanding shares to one). In line with the put payoffs specified in (2), we can calculate the value of the puts issued by the high type as follows: To check if this trial solution is an equilibrium, we need to examine whether the low type has an incentive to mimic the high type's joint put-equity issue. When the low type mimics, the expected payoff to its putholders is gain from selling overpriced new equity. Notice that the 2.14 difference between the 4.12 loss on the puts and the 1.98 gain on the new equity equals the 2.14 payoff difference we calculated above for the low type's existing equityholders under the only equity and joint put-equity scenarios.
An intuitive way to understand the separating equilibrium is through Figure 2 , which plots the payoff to existing equityholders under the low type's all-equity and the high type's equity-put financing strategies. We see that the all-equity strategy results in existing equityholders getting a fixed percentage of the realized cash flow. On the other hand, the equity-put strategy leads to equityholders getting nothing when the cash flow realization is less than βX = 7.5, but a larger proportional ownership equity stake (i.e., (1 − α H ) = 94.7% > (1 − α L ) = 85%) which leads to a greater payoff when the cash flow realization exceeds 39.03. The existing equityholders of the low type prefer the all-equity strategy because of the higher probability of poor outcomes, whereas those of the high type prefer the equity-put strategy because of the higher probability of good outcomes.
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We have shown in Proposition 1 that for I = I T the only feasible (β, X) pair is (1, X T ).
In general, when making its issue-invest decision for I < I T , the high type can select from multiple (β, X) combinations that satisfy the conditions for a separating equilibrium. In this section, we derive properties of the feasible region of (β, X) combinations and show that in the limit as I tends to I T the feasible region shrinks to a point. We also examine how choosing a specific (β, X) combination from among the feasible combinations affects trade-offs that management may consider in its issue-invest decision.
Feasible Combinations of Number of Puts and Exercise Price
As a first step in defining the feasible region and understanding the implications of selecting a specific (β, X) combination, we define β (X) as the minimum β for a given X that achieves separation. In other words, β (X) is the percentage granted to putholders that exactly satisfies the low type's incentive compatibility constraint for a given exercise price.
Proposition 2 β (X) is decreasing in the exercise price X, that is ∂β ∂X < 0, for all X > X, where β (X) = 1.
The above proposition also defines the minimum exercise price, X, which can achieve non-dissipative separation. For X = X, the no-overissue constraint (N OI H ), which limits the number of puts to be no more than the total number of outstanding shares, binds (i.e., β (X) = 1). Thus, all X < X are not feasible. For all X > X, the premium collected by the firm on a single put is increasing in the exercise price. All else equal, the larger the premium collected on each put, the smaller the amount that needs to be collected from issuing new equity. As the amount of new equity issued decreases, the low type's capacity to gain from selling overpriced equity also decreases. Hence the fewer the number of puts that the high type needs to issue to counter the low type's mimicing of its equity issuance. The function β (X), thus, defines the lower bound of the feasible region. It is a downward sloping function which starts at a value equal to 1 at X = X. Given an X > X, all β < β (X) are unable to achieve separation.
To characterize the upper bound of the feasible region, we denote the upper bound of β for a given X as β(X) and derive its properties in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 β (X) equals unity for all X such that X < X < X and is decreasing in X for all X > X, where X is defined as P H β = 1, X = X = I.
For exercise prices from X to X, the no-overissue constraint (N OI H ) binds and β(X) equals 100% of outstanding shares. For exercise prices greater than X, the no-repurchase constraint (N R H ) binds and β(X) is such that the put proceeds fully fund the project.
Returning to our numerical example, Figure 3 (Panel A) plots β(X) and β(X) for I = 5.
We first examine the plot for β(X). The right-most point is where the exercise price is set equal to 100, which is the upper bound of potential firm cash flows and hence the highest potential t = 1 share price (see equation (1)). For an exercise price of 100, puts must be issued on at least 5.55% of outstanding shares if the high type is to achieve separation. We can see that for lower exercise prices, the high type must issue an increasing number of puts. At the other extreme, when an exercise price of X = 18.11 is set, the firm must issue puts on all of its outstanding shares. Now we turn our attention to the plot for β(X). For the upper bound exercise price of 100, the high type fully funds the project by issuing puts on 13.25 percent of its outstanding shares. For successively lower exercise prices down to X = 42.17, the high type fully funds the project by issuing an increasing number of puts.
For exercise prices from X = 42.17 down to X = 18.11, the high type is capped at issuing puts on all of its outstanding shares.
As it turns out when I = 5, the highest feasible exercise price is the maximum t = 1 share price of 100. For some larger I, though, we show below that the maximum exercise price is less than 100. To understand why this is so, we need to complete the description of the feasible region by defining the maximum possible exercise price for a given investment level. We denote the crossing point of β (X) and β (X) with X C . Thus,
We also define the maximum feasible exercise price as X, where
The maximum feasible exercise price X depends on whether the crossing point X C occurs to the left or the right of the maximum possible firm cash flow C. If the crossing point occurs to the right (i.e., β X = C ≥ β X = C ), then X simply equals C. On the other hand if the crossing point occurs to the left (i.e., β C < β C ), then from the continuity of both β (X) and β (X) we know that there exists some X C > X such that β (X C ) = β (X C ). Any X above X C is infeasible.
Finally, we are in a position to characterize the feasible region of (β, X) combinations that achieve non-dissipative separation.
Proposition 4 For a given I, the region of feasible (β, X) combinations that can achieve non-dissipative separation is bounded above by β (X) and below by β (X) for all X ∈ X, X , where X is strictly increasing in I. In the limit, for I → I T , both X and X are equal at X T and the feasible region shrinks to a point (β = 1, X = X T ).
Proposition 4 states that the minimum exercise price that achieves separation is increasing in the investment financing required. Given a specific level of financing required, recognize that the minimum exercise price is such that the high type issues puts on all of its outstanding shares and the low type's incentive compatibility constraint is exactly satisfied.
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An increase in required financing means that the high type must increase the proceeds that it raises from either its put or equity issue. If the high type increases its equity issue by issuing more shares, then the low type has an opportunity to mimic and sell more high priced equity. Given that the value of puts is such that the low type is indifferent between mimicing and not mimicing, the low type's incentive compatibility constraint is violated.
The alternative is for the high type to increase the proceeds that is raises from its put issue, which can only be done by increasing the exercise price as it cannot issue more puts than the total number of its outstanding shares.
Returning to our numerical example, we illustrate this result in Figure 4 , which plots the feasible (β, X) regions for three different investment levels of 10, 22, and 27. Notice that the feasible (β, X) region shifts upward and to the right for successively higher investment levels. Also notice the maximum feasible exercise price is only 90 for an investment level of 27. This maximum feasible exercise price continues to fall for higher investment levels and reaches a low of 75 at the maximum possible investment level of 28.13.
Trade-Offs to Choosing a Specific (β, X) Combination
We have shown that for all investment levels except the threshold investment I T there exists an infinite number of possible (β, X) combinations which achieve separation. In this section, we examine how choosing a specific (β, X) combination affects the proportion of total proceeds raised through puts versus equity and the probability that the high type defaults on its put obligation. We should clarify that we are merely characterizing potential trade-offs that management may consider in its issue-invest decision. Given that these factors do not enter explicitly into the management's objective function in our model, we are not solving for an optimal (β, X) combination. As we point out in our concluding remarks, an explicit consideration of these and other factors that may enter into management's issueinvest decision provide directions for future research.
Put versus Equity Proceeds
Our analysis shows that the higher the exercise price, the greater the premium collected on a single put and the fewer the minimum number of puts required for separation. This leads to a natural question: How does the minimum proportion of total proceeds that is raised through puts change when the high type sets a higher exercise price? Similarly, how does the maximum percentage change?
We define γ as the percentage of the investment opportunity that the high type funds with puts:
We term γ as the minimum percentage that can be raised through puts such that a separating equilibrium obtains, and γ as the maximum percentage. Correspondingly, we define α and α as the percentage of shares granted to new equityholders associated with a given γ and γ, respectively.
Proposition 5 1. For X ∈ X, X the minimum proportion of funding raised through puts is increasing in the exercise price, that is ∂γ ∂X > 0. Consequently, the associated maximum percentage of shares going to new equityholders is decreasing in the exercise price, that is ∂α ∂X < 0.
2. The maximum proportion of funding raised through puts is increasing in exercise price for X ∈ X, X and is equal to 100 percent for X ∈ X, X . Consequently, the associated minimum percentage of shares going to new equityholders is decreasing in the exercise price for X ∈ X, X and is equal to zero for X ∈ X, X .
An increase in the exercise price for a given γ reduces the difference in value of P H and P L . This is because the higher cash flow realizations are more likely for the high type 22 than the low type. This lowers the amount of put overpricing for the low type. To achieve separation now the high type needs to increase the amount raised from puts, which in turn lowers the amount of equity underpricing for the low type.
The implication is that if management desires to maximize existing equityholders' fractional ownership in the firm, then it should select a higher exercise price. This may be the case, for example, for a closely held firm whose owners desire to retain voting control.
Referring back to our numerical example with I = 5, Panels B and C of Figure 3 plot γ and γ and the corresponding α and α. We calculate that X = 42.17, which means that for all X greater than 42.17 the high type fully funds the project with puts. On the other hand, if the firm is desirous of reducing the amount of funding raised from puts, then we see that the minimum percentage of funding raised from puts is 7.92 percent for an exercise price of 18.11 and that it climbs to 39.1 percent for an exercise price of 100. The corresponding percentage of equity given to new shareholders decreases from 6.95 percent to 4.71 percent. Of course, management does not need to dilute existing equityholders' control at all if decides to fund the investment entirely with puts. As we see immediately below, though, management needs to consider how this would effect the probability that the firm is unable to make good on its put obligations.
The Probability of Default
In making its issue-invest decision, management is also likely to consider the probability that the firm will default on any puts that it issues. We define δ as the probability that a high type will default on its put obligation:
We term δ and δ as the probability of default that is associated with a given β and β, respectively.
We have already established in Proposition 2 that an increase in the number of puts or a higher exercise price reduce the incentive for the low type to mimic the high type's financing strategy. Thus, fewer puts are required to achieve separation when the high type selects a higher exercise price. Given that the probability of default is a function of the product of the number of puts and the exercise price, the minimum probability of default will depend on whether the effect of fewer puts dominates the effect of a higher exercise price. In Proposition 6, we show that the change in β dominates.
Proposition 6 1. The minimum probability of default is decreasing in the exercise price, that is ∂δ ∂X < 0.
2. The maximum probability of default is increasing in the exercise price, that is ∂δ ∂X > 0, for X ∈ X, X , and decreasing in the exercise price, that is ∂δ ∂X < 0, for X ∈ X, X .
One way to understand the result is to consider the payoff received by putholders as a function of different cash flow realizations. The combined effect of the reduction in the number of puts and the increase in the exercise price is to shift putholder payoffs from lower to higher cash flow realizations. This shift is sufficiently large to reduce the probability that the firm defaults on its obligation to putholders.
Once again returning to the numerical example, we illustrate the decrease in the minimum probability of default for lower exercise prices in Figure 3 (Panel D). The minimum probability of default attains its highest value of 3.3% when the high type decides to issue puts with a exercise price of 18.11 on all of its outstanding stock. We see that the probability of default decreases as fewer puts are issued with higher exercise prices. The minimum probability of default reaches its lowest value of 0.3% percent when puts with an exercise price of 100 are issued on 5.5% percent of outstanding shares.
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This paper establishes conditions under which puts can be used to mitigate adverse selection costs. Puts are shown to be a non-dissipative signalling mechanism in the sense that firms with favorable private information about future prospects can gain separation without having to resort to 'money burning' actions or inefficient investment decisions. Costless separation is possible because puts allow the firm to commit to pay bigger fractions of its assets in the bad states of nature, which are more likely for the low type firm.
Given our results, it is a puzzle as to why puts have been used relatively few times by firms raising money in the capital markets. Another puzzle is the structure to date of these joint put-equity issuances. Although our results suggest that the full benefit of adverse selection mitigation is achieved by issuing more puts than shares, to our knowledge issuances have been for equal numbers of puts and shares or only puts. The reason behind these puzzles may be as simple as corporate managers not being fully informed about puts as a viable financing alternative given their relative newness. Other potential explanations include possible management perceptions that puts restrict future financing flexibility in a way similar to that with debt or that puts carry prohibitively high transaction costs. The
reason is an open question which we hope will be addressed in future research.
An issue worthy of study is the impact of managerial and ownership separation on our proposed solution to the adverse selection problem. Although we do not explicitly model agency issues, puts do not appear to have an agency problem as a side-effect. To the contrary, puts give strong incentives to management that aligns its interests with those of equityholders. When the firm performs poorly, puts provide a mechanism by which free cash flows are automatically diverted to putholders. This contractual obligation to pay out excess cash to putholders constrains managers of poorly performing firms from engaging in empire building. Moreover, in the event that cash is exhausted, managers are forced to enter the external capital markets where they are subjected to the specialist monitoring of commercial bankers, bond rating agencies, and equity analysts.
Another issue worthy of study is the potential for financial distress costs associated with put exercise. If the put contract calls for cash settlement, their exercise could cause or exacerbate a liquidity crises. Further, David (2001) points out that putholders may have a strategic option to exercise and force a firm to bear financial distress costs, in which case the puts would have a strategic value greater than their intrinsic value. As we note in our analysis, however, all our results go through if the put contract calls for equity rather than cash settlement. What we do not explicitly model are the corporate control issues associated with equity versus cash settlement.
Although puts appear to hold promise as a viable financing strategy, further research is warranted as to how puts stack up against possible alternative mechanisms with respect to factors such as agency problems, corporate control issues, and potential financial distress costs that are not explicitly addressed in our model.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is standard and is provided here for completeness. The equilibrium, if it exists, is non-dissipative because the payoff to the firm's existing equityholders is given by
which is the full-information payoff. Sufficiency is immediate as (IC i ) ensures that the objective function of firm type i is maximized by choosing ψ i (C), the market correctly conjectures firm type i on observing ψ i (C) and prices accordingly. We also need to show that the firm is individually rational. That is , it is better off issuing securities and investing than not investing, which is true if
The last inequality is implied by (N P V i ). To show the necessity, assume that there exist securities that satisfy the conditions of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The firm choosing to issue securities implies (IR i ). To prove the necessity of (IC i ), suppose (IC i ) is not satisfied for some type. In that case the firm of that type will prefer to choose issue securities of the other type, which implies the market conjecture will not be correct.
Proof of Lemma
We use the above with (CR L ) to obtain a contradiction in the following:
Proof of Lemma 3: From (CR H ) we have
and simplifying we obtain the condition below,
the constraint (IC H ) is satisfied as
Proof of Proposition 1: We will first show that for I = I T the high type issuing only puts with β = 1 and X = X T is a possible equilibrium. Next we will show than any I > I T cannot be sustained.
From the definition of
is satisfied as the low type by mimicing cannot do any better than by issuing equity alone and being identified as a low type. To see this more formally, substitute P L = P H in (7) and obtain
which is true by definition. (IC H ) is satisfied as the high type by mimicing gives up α L percent of E H and is strictly worse off than issuing only puts because
and P H = I, implying α L E H > P H . The other constraints are clearly satisfied.
To show that I > I T cannot be financed we need to consider the following alternatives:
1. X > X T and β = 1.
2. X > X T and β < 1.
3. X = X T and β < 1.
4. X < X T and β = 1.
5. X < X T and β < 1.
Notice that we do not consider increasing β due to (N OI H ). In Proposition 5, we show that the percentage of funding required that is raised from puts is increasing in X. At X = X T and I = I T the high type is already raising 100 percent of financing from puts, increasing X for I ≥ I T is not feasible. Thus, alternatives 1 and 2 are ruled out.
We show below that the RHS of (7) is monotonically increasing in β and X. Thus, reducing β from 1 and/or reducing X from X T violates (IC L ), which rules out alternatives 3, 4, and 5.
To show that the above is positive, we use
and show,
29
We first show that the RHS of (8) is less than
The above is true because MLR property implies that
> 0, all we need to show is
Thus, it is sufficient to show that
which is trivially true. We next show that the RHS of (7) is increasing in X for all β:
and thus we need to show
which we have already done in (10).
Proof of Corollary 1:
The total payoff to outside security holders ψ (C) is given by, For α H ≥ β the above is increasing in C and, thus, violates the condition presented in Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 2: For the low type to be indifferent, (7) implies that we need 
Both of the above have been shown to be positive in the proof of Proposition (1).
Proof of Proposition 3: β is defined as follows:
P H X, β = I for all X > X Again using the implicit function theorem, we have
Proof of Proposition 4: By definition of β, all β less than β violate (IC L ). For X ∈ X, X , β = 1 and, thus, all β > β are infeasible. For X ∈ X, X , P H = I and all β > β violate (N R H ). To show that X is increasing in I, notice that we have already shown in Proposition 1 that RHS of (7) is increasing in X.
For I = I T , X T is the minimum X that satisfies (IC L ). Thus, X (I T ) = X T . We have also shown in the proof of Proposition (1) that for I = I T , X > X T is not feasible. Thus, X (I T ) = X T and the only feasible β = 1. 
We need to show For X ∈ X, X , β = 1. Thus, γ (X) = P H (β = 1, X) I for X ∈ X, X ∂ ∂X γ (X) = 1 I ∂ ∂X P H (β = 1, X) > 0
The result on α follows.
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Proof of Proposition 6: The probability of the high type defaulting on its puts is G H (βX) , which is monotonic in βX. To show that the minimum probability of default is decreasing in X, we show ∂ ∂X Xβ (X) = β (X) + X ∂ ∂X β (X) < 0
We need to show that
which is trivially true.
δ for X ∈ X, X is increasing because in this region β = 1 and ∂ ∂X βX = X > 0.
The case for X ∈ X, X is more interesting as β is decreasing in this region. Again β is defined by P H X, β = I for all X ∈ X, X . Thus, 
